Article published in The Daily Telegraph, 3 July 2023. © Richard Kemp

Even if Ukraine’s counter-offensive might be unfolding more slowly than many expected, it is Moscow not Kyiv that is running out of time. Since the operation began weeks ago, little territory has changed hands. That is despite expectations stoked by Kyiv’s allies, who have been eager to show bang for their buck to electorates keenly aware of the cost of the war.

But immediate gratification was always going to be elusive. Even with billions of dollars of Western aid, Ukraine lacks the kind of overwhelming force that allowed the US-led coalition to rapidly crush Iraq in 1991 and 2003. Amid a succession of probing attacks to find weakness in the Russian lines, hopes of a quick breakthrough such as we witnessed in Kharkiv and Kherson last autumn are being displaced by fear that Kyiv’s Nato-equipped forces will be dashed to pieces and Russia will go back onto the offensive.

Indeed, that seems to be Russia’s current strategy: to wear its enemy down against a hard defensive belt prepared over many months and then either force President Zelensky to come to terms or to rampage again into a weakened Ukrainian army.

Putin will very much prefer the first option, because he no longer has confidence that his forces can prevail in large-scale offensive operations. He may also fear escalation by the West, whose support for Ukraine against all expectations sent him into shock. That fear will have been reinforced by a resolution introduced last month in the US Senate that any Russian use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine will be viewed as an attack on Nato itself, requiring an Article V response.

Ukraine’s slow-going offensive, which has already sustained significant casualties in both men and tanks, might seem to be playing into Putin’s plan to wait it out. But how much time does the Russian president actually have, especially after Wagner’s abortive insurrection? Continue reading →

Article published in The Daily Telegraph, 30 June 2023. © Richard Kemp

Last week the deputy commander of Nato, British General Sir Tim Radford, complained that our army is too small and now the Chief of the General Staff, Sir Patrick Sanders, is saying the same thing. They could not be more right. The British Army has been continuously run down for decades, with regular forces slashed from 97,000 to 76,000 in the last 10 years and another 3,000 slated to follow them out of the door. Tank numbers are being cut by a third from an already derisory 227 to just 148 and tracked armoured infantry fighting vehicles got rid of altogether.

Sanders compared this dire situation with British military neglect in the 1930s, but it is far worse than that. By the time Hitler unleashed his blitzkrieg in Poland, our political leaders had woken up and were frantically re-arming. Now, in the face of the worst European war since 1945, with every other Nato member building its forces, Britain dementedly continues to cut.

Numbers are not everything, but if it were not already obvious, the Ukraine war has again demonstrated the supremacy of mass – in men, tanks, guns, planes and artillery. Bakhmut, the most intensive battle in Europe since the Second World War, with powerful Ukrainian forces defeated after months of combat, is a case in point. Commanders who were fighting there told me how sheer numbers of men, armoured vehicles and above all an endless stream of artillery shells had prevailed. Despite superior Ukrainian battle tactics, leadership, morale, surveillance, intelligence and cyber, brute force – as always in war – won the day.

That sort of thinking went out of fashion years ago in an increasingly woke Whitehall, with too much emphasis on so-called ‘soft power’, humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, propping up the NHS, environmentalism and mentoring other people’s armies rather than the dirty business of mud, blood and violence. That helped influence the prioritisation of nice clean fighting tools like cyber, robotics and IT Continue reading →

Article published by Ynetnews.com, 29 June 2023. © Richard Kemp

We don’t know what the White House thinks of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s planned visit to Beijing, but despite the horror expressed by so many commentators in Israel I wouldn’t be surprised if Jerusalem and Washington discussed the invitation before it was accepted. Whether or not that happened, to use Menachem Begin’s words in 1982 to then-Sen. Joe Biden, the Israeli prime minister should not in any case be ‘a Jew with trembling knees’. He should take account of his greatest ally’s perspective, and then follow his own perception of Israel’s sovereign national interests.

Those who have attacked the planned visit as poking a stick in Biden’s eye after he failed to extend an invitation to the White House, or even suggested Netanyahu is looking for an alternative partnership to the US, are clearly mistaken. The former thought underestimates Netanyahu’s political savvy – whatever anyone thinks of his policies and character – and the latter is simply laughable.

Netanyahu is never going to lead his country closer to the Chinese dictatorship at the expense of the fundamental relationship with America, just as the first Israeli prime minister, David Ben Gurion, was never going to opt for Soviet patronage in defiance of America despite immense pressure from Stalin to do so. The US is and will remain Israel’s closest and most important strategic and military ally and the two countries share common cultural, liberal and democratic values. China’s repressive communist autocracy, on the other hand, is anathema to Israelis, including the current government.

The reasons Netanyahu needs to go to Beijing are obvious. China is Israel’s third largest global trading partner, although a trend of growth between the two countries has slowed mainly as a result of Israel’s own national security considerations and accommodation of US concerns, especially regarding key national infrastructure. Balancing such enormous economic interests with security issues and the US position is critical and has potentially far-reaching consequences. In an interview at the end of last year Netanyahu emphasized the difference between Israel’s deep relationships with Continue reading →

Article published in The Daily Telegraph, 25 June 2023. © Richard Kemp

Vladimir Putin’s short-term Special Military Operation to bring Kyiv to heel has escalated into a two-front war with his control slipping away. He was having enough trouble on the Ukrainian front, with an enemy that refused to buckle, backed by unexpectedly obdurate allies. His own army has been exposed to the world as a rotting façade rendered inadequate by decades of complacency and corruption.

Prigozhin’s abortive coup d’etat has now opened up a home front that has similarly exposed the regime’s weakness and the vulnerability of the country’s internal security. Prigozhin was able to seize and hold Moscow’s command centre for the entire Ukraine war without a shot being fired. His heavily armed mercenaries could then advance hundreds of miles towards Moscow, largely unmolested, and with reports of Russian soldiers surrendering in their path. On the way to Moscow, Wagner forces reportedly shot down seven helicopters and a transport plane – if true, one of the deadliest days for the Russian air force since the war in Ukraine began.

As with the recent incursions from Ukraine into Belgorod, the Kremlin lacked forces to secure even key targets inside Russia. They had to depend on another private militia, Ramzan Kadyrov’s Chechens, who apparently sent 3,000 men from Ukraine to confront Wagner. Moscow’s critical vulnerability will not be fixed without withdrawing already stretched forces from the front line.

As we have seen so often in Ukraine, Russian forces are unable to respond to unexpected crises without orders from above. This helps explain why Prigozhin’s men could get as far as they did. That those stop orders were not forthcoming exposes Putin’s weakness. His desperation to avoid violent clashes between Russian soldiers and Wagner mercenaries led to paralysis in the Kremlin accompanied by a frantic search for a way to shut Prigozhin down without bloodshed, eventually pressing Belarus’s Lukashenko into action. It’s not likely Putin cared about casualties on either side, but he did care about the potential disintegration at the front line caused by violent Continue reading →

Article published in The Sunday Telegraph, 17 June 2023. © Richard Kemp

Nato needs to brace itself for the prospect of Ukraine’s counteroffensive failing to achieve major success. Indeed, so far, Kyiv has attained only limited gains. But those who expected a lightning breakthrough were always going to be disappointed. This is not German panzers against Polish horse cavalry, nor is it American shock and awe against demoralised Iraqi forces in antiquated tanks with no air cover.

Instead, we are seeing something closer to an attritional style of warfare, with attacking forces battering against heavily fortified defences. Current operations are at the stage of reconnaissance-in-force along four separate axes of advance, with Ukrainian units probing Russian positions to identify weak spots that can then be softened up with artillery and exploited by armoured reserve forces. Commandos and partisans are said to be working behind enemy lines to create confusion and disrupt command and control centres. Long range strikes are being used to hit headquarters.

Critical here is deception, attacking in as many areas as possible to keep the Russians guessing where the major thrusts will come. But in war, operations rarely go to plan and the odds are stacked against Kyiv. Russia’s General Valery Gerasimov has had a lot of time and resources to prepare effective defences in multiple lines .The Russians also have numerical superiority in pretty much everything, from men and tanks to, perhaps most critically, artillery.

Then there is air power. Almost every attacking force from the Second World War onwards has succeeded only with air superiority or supremacy. This the Ukrainians do not have, and we have already seen the cost of that with battlefield footage apparently showing American-supplied Bradley fighting vehicles and German Leopard 2 tanks picked off by attack helicopters.

So this counter offensive could go either way. But one thing is certain: a Ukrainian victory is very far from guaranteed. We can Continue reading →

Article published by Ynetnews.com, 17 June 2023. © Richard Kemp

A new interim nuclear deal between the US and Iran may be imminent. US denials that such a deal is on the table are likely motivated by an intention to frame it as an informal understanding rather than an international treaty in order to avoid the need for Congressional endorsement, thus reflecting semantics instead of reality.

Leaked details of the ‘non-deal’ suggest Iran would agree to cease enrichment activity and give other undertakings, including freeing US-Iranian dual citizens currently held in custody, in return for sanctions relief that would immediately release around $20 billion of frozen Iranian funds with hundreds of billions more to follow.

The White House knows that no diplomatic understanding with Tehran is worth the paper it’s printed on and no such undertakings will stop Iran from becoming a nuclear-armed state.

So why are they heading down this path? There are two reasons. The first is to give Biden a win on the international stage that he so badly needs after the debacles over withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and China supplanting the US as power broker in the Middle East.

The second is to pile pressure on Israel and this again has two parts. Part one is to deter Jerusalem from executing a major military strike against Iran’s nuclear programme which has become more plausible since Benjamin Netanyahu resumed the premiership.

Despite the catalogue of foreign policy failures that arose directly from craven weakness in Washington, the White House does not seem to have learned that deterrence is the most effective means of averting war and remains fearful not only of wielding a credible military threat against Iran but also of Israel doing so. Biden and those around him know that an extant nuclear agreement with Tehran, supported by the Europeans, complicates any military action by Israel. Continue reading →

Article published in The Daily Telegraph, 13 June 2023. © Richard Kemp

War is – by definition – a bloody business. Yet if you had told me an army in the 21st century could lose eight generals in combat, and perhaps as many as 15, a mere 16 months into a campaign, I would have struggled to believe you. The death of Russian Major General Sergei Goryachev – reportedly killed this week in Ukraine by a British-supplied Storm Shadow missile – marks such a milestone. For context, no western army has faced such high fatality rates among its senior officers since 1945.

The death of Goryachev is a severe blow for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s defence against Ukraine’s counter-offensive. Goryachev was not just a general, but Chief of Staff of the 35th Combined Arms Army: a critical role responsible for planning, coordinating and controlling operations across a broad front. His death will mean the combat effectiveness of his forces will suffer major disruption.

Not only that, but in his command post, Goryachev will have been surrounded by his most important staff officers. The loss of just one of these individuals can be keenly felt at the front. The closest parallel in my own experience was the death in 1994 of the Assistant Chief of Staff in Northern Ireland, along with 24 senior police and military intelligence officers. That was a helicopter crash not enemy action, but the impact on military operations, with the loss of their collective knowledge and experience, was long-lasting and profound.

In Ukraine, Russian generals have often been forced to the front through necessity. Last year we learned a combination of inferior secure communications and Ukrainian electronic warfare obliged some commanders to command from the front. But the problem runs deeper. The Russian way of warfare – still operating to a highly inflexible, top-down command doctrine – means that generals are often obliged to take personal command in a fashion alien to most western armies. Continue reading →

Article published in The Daily Telegraph, 6 June 2023. © Richard Kemp

For a man who consistently churns out stupid comments, Emmanuel Macron is not a complete fool. He understands that limitations of range or geography no longer apply in the interconnected 21st-century world, where international threats cannot be compartmentalised by region. Taiwanese semiconductors and Pacific trade passages – and their potential disruption or denial – are just as important to Europe as they are to Japan, Australia, India and the US.

Yet this reality, and Mr Macron’s knowledge of it, has not stopped the French president from reportedly seeking to block the implementation of a Nato office in Tokyo – the alliance’s first outpost in the Indo-Pacific – on the basis that it is geographically far-flung.

Of course, this pathetic justification would not be the real reason for his objection. Rather, it’d be about two matters of pure self-interest. First, Macron hopes to avoid anything that might increase tensions with Beijing, especially after his attempts to cosy up to Xi Jinping in the interests of French business. This has led the French to distance themselves from American efforts to decouple from China. And it is why, after his recent visit to Beijing, Macron suggested Europe should recoil from the dispute over Taiwan to avoid becoming an American ‘vassal’.

This aversion to the US leads to the second point of self-interest: Macron wants to lead a Europe strategically autonomous from America and ‘brain dead’ Nato, albeit while remaining unable to pick up the price tag that would entail. It beggars belief that he should continue with this unrealistic obsession, driven as it is by hubris rather than realpolitik, even as the fact of European dependency on Washington has yet again been driven home by the war in Ukraine.

For some, it will be difficult not to suspect one more, even more parochial motivation for Macron’s position. He is still smarting from France’s exclusion from Aukus and the loss of its diesel powered submarine deal with Australia in favour of British-American nuclear Continue reading →